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 Summary
 In community-driven development (CDD) 
programmes, communities are in charge of 
identifying, implementing and maintaining their own 
externally funded development projects. These 
programmes have been implemented in low- and 
middle-income countries to fund public infrastructure. 
Sometimes, they have also been used to finance 
private transfers to individual households. 
 In the last few decades, CDD programmes have 
received substantial funding, notably from the World 
Bank. During this period, they have evolved from 
being a response for mitigating the social cost of 
structural adjustment to becoming an alternative and 
presumably cheaper delivery mechanism for social 
services that works directly with communities. 
 CDD programme objectives have evolved over time. 
The programmes in the early 1990s had more of  
an emphasis on poverty reduction and infrastructure 
building; the programmes in the late 1990s and 
2000s have focused on decentralisation and 
improving local governance and social cohesion.
 We carried out this synthesis study to assess  
how CDD programmes have evolved over the  
years. We were interested in examining whether 
programme objectives and design have changed 
over the decades and how effective CDD has been  
in improving outcomes. We synthesised evidence 
from 25 impact evaluations, covering 23 programmes 
in 21 low- and middle-income countries.
 How CDD programmes work 
 The CDD programme implementing agency  
typically carries out communication and outreach 
activities to make communities aware of the 
programme and build support for broad participation. 
The funding structure takes one of two forms – the 
application-based model, in which communities are 
required to apply for block grants, or the allocation 
model, through which the implementer allocates 
grants to targeted communities.
 Community members usually select development 
projects at a meeting organised by an existing 
community organisation or a newly established 
community project committee that is set up for  
the programme. Most CDD programmes require  
a community project committee to be set up to 
manage the development projects. 
 The committee oversees implementation of  
the community project, management of financial 
resources, procurement of materials and hiring  
of contractors. The committee and other community 
members may receive training in project and  
financial management and governance, and 
technical training for maintenance. Community 
members are usually also required to contribute 
cash, materials or labour to the project.
 The CDD programme implementer usually  
facilitates the process of community participation  
in project selection and management. Facilitation  
has been used to increase the participation of  
women and marginalised populations. Facilitators 
have also played a part in conflict resolution.
 The theory of change for CDD programmes  
focuses on two sets of outcomes: (1) social welfare; 
and (2) social cohesion and governance. For CDD 
programmes to achieve these outcomes, there  
are several assumptions about implementer and 
community capacity, as well as the political economy.
 Impacts
 Social infrastructure and social welfare
 CDD programmes have made a substantial 
contribution to improving the quantity of small-scale 
infrastructure. But these programmes have a weak 
effect on health outcomes and mostly insignificant 
effects on education and other welfare outcomes. 
The exception is the clear impact of improved water 
supply on time savings.
 Construction quality of infrastructure is generally 
comparable to that of other investments, but there 
are exceptions when it is inferior. CDD programmes’ 
lack of impact on higher-order outcomes can be 
explained by CDD’s focus on infrastructure, where 
complementary inputs have not always been 
provided to address context-specific challenges  
to social welfare. 
 There is presumably a cost advantage to  
using CDD approaches. However, it is not clear  
if CDD programmes are a more cost-effective 
delivery mechanism, especially compared with  
local government.
 CDD programmes have put in place different 
institutional and financial mechanisms for operating 
and maintaining community projects. However,  
there are sometimes challenges in maintaining 
projects, such as limited community capacity, and 
recurrent expenses are not always met. 
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 Social cohesion and governance
 CDD programmes have little or no impact on social 
cohesion and governance. This synthesis study 
shows that the assumption that the entire community 
participates in the programme is not valid. Data  
show that the participation in decision-making  
is limited to a small number of community members. 
There is a clear ‘funnel of attrition’; many people  
may be aware of the programme and the community 
meeting, but few participate in the meeting and  
fewer still speak or participate in decision-making. 
People participated in making bricks, not decisions.
 CDD programmes may be using social cohesion 
rather than building it. Numerous factors may  
affect community involvement, such as the role 
played by the elite or prime movers in the community, 
intra-community divisions and the perceived  
benefits of participation.
 CDD’s impact on governance is sometimes 
undermined by the creation of parallel structures  
for the sake of the programme. The function of  
these governance structures is not clear once the 
community projects end.
 How CDD programmes promote equity
 Targeting
 CDD programmes, especially social funds, have 
explicit mechanisms such as poverty maps to reach 
poorer areas. This approach has been successful  
in achieving greater allocation of resources to poorer 
areas, but not always to the poorest communities in 
those areas. Where an application-based, demand-
driven model was used, better-off communities  
within districts tended to benefit more than poor 
communities. Implementers have overcome these 
biases through fund allocation rules with clear 
eligibility criteria. 
 The community’s elite or prime movers can  
play an important role in application-based CDD 
programmes, as they are more likely to know  
about the programme and have the skills for putting 
together a proposal. The type of community project 
selected and the community contribution requirement 
also affect who benefits from the programme.
 Community-driven reconstruction programmes  
are generally successful in reaching conflict- 
affected areas. However, it can be contentious  
to target ex-combatants or conflict-affected persons  
for support rather than the community as a whole.
 Participation of marginalised people and women
 Although CDD programmes have included measures 
to improve the participation of marginalised groups, 
there is no evidence on the impact of such measures. 
There is also no information about how programme 
implementers facilitated the participation of different 
ethnic and religious groups living in a community. 
 Although women rarely feature in the objectives  
of CDD programmes, they are named as a 
beneficiary target group in 15 of the 23 programmes 
included in this review. Most programmes also  
had rules or measures for encouraging women’s 
participation in project identification and on project 
committees, implying an assumption that by 
engaging in these activities, women are more  
likely to benefit from supported projects. Several 
CDD programmes had an indicative target for the 
percentage of women on the project committee  
or a rule for ensuring female representation on it.
 Gendered cultural norms and socio-economic  
factors powerfully and negatively influence  
women’s participation in the public sphere. Where 
female participation is a target, not a requirement, 
women’s participation appears to fall short. Available 
data show that women are only half as likely as  
men to be aware of CDD programmes, even less 
likely to attend the community meetings and even 
more less likely to speak at the meetings. 
 Although CDD programmes have features that 
encourage women’s participation in meetings and 
village committees, less attention has been paid  
to their participation in project implementation, 
operations, maintenance and monitoring. Not many 
studies have carried out sex-disaggregated analysis 
of participation. Fewer still have assessed whether 
CDD programmes have empowered women to take  
a more active role in the public sphere, beyond the 
scope of the programme.
 Implications for CDD policies and 
programmes
 The evidence from this synthesis and previous 
studies suggests that it may be better to abandon  
the CDD programme objective of building social 
cohesion and focus instead on sustainable,  
cost-effective delivery of small-scale infrastructure.
 Programme implementers need to assess if 
community members are willing or able to make 
contributions to development projects.
 Moving beyond the definition of a community as  
a geographical administrative unit and considering 
different groups and gendered power relations  
in the community would be important for delivering 
more equitable programmes.
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 Since small-scale infrastructure is a major 
programme output, implementers should pay  
explicit attention to the technical, institutional and 
financial mechanisms in place for ensuring that  
these facilities are maintained and operate properly.
 Designing CDD programmes involves a number  
of decisions where various trade-offs need to  
be considered:
The institutional set-up of the CDD agency, 
whether as an independent agency or as part  
of an existing ministry or department, influences 
the impact of the programme. There is a trade-off 
between the possible greater efficiency and 
flexibility of an independent agency and the  
greater government buy-in and sustainability of  
the processes implemented by an existing ministry.
The choice between using an application-based 
model and an allocation model should be informed 
by community capacity, financing and programme 
targeting objectives.
There is a trade-off between breadth and depth  
of coverage – reaching more communities or 
spending more in each.
 Implications for research 
 Social cohesion is a complex concept. Most  
impact evaluations have assessed both bonding 
social capital, such as trust and cooperation in  
the community, and bridging social capital, such as 
social connectedness with authority. It would be 
important to consider the possible friction between 
these elements of social capital.
 Quantitative impact evaluations should assess the 
political economy of local decision-making or the 
different levels of existing social cohesion between 
sub-groups in a community.
 Evaluations should also examine how issues related 
to the type of institution involved in implementation, 
the targeting of communities and the sustainability  
of arrangements influence programme impact.  
Future studies also need to examine how factors 
such as grant size, continuity of funding, facilitation  
of community participation and longer-term provision 
of training improve outcomes.
 Impact evaluations should give more explicit 
attention to the comparison condition and what  
the counterfactual is measuring.
 A cost comparison of CDD programmes and  
other delivery channels is one of the most  
important areas for future research. This would  
allow cost-effectiveness or cost–benefit analysis  
to be carried out and capture the practical 
significance of the impacts.
 We need more process evaluations and qualitative 
research for causal chain analysis – for assessing 
why and for whom programmes work or do not work 
at each stage of implementation.
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 In community-driven development (CDD) 
programmes, the community is in charge of 
identifying, implementing and maintaining its own 
externally funded development projects. These 
programmes have been implemented in low-  
and middle-income countries to fund the building  
or rehabilitation of schools, water supply and 
sanitation systems, health facilities, roads and  
other kinds of public infrastructure. Sometimes, they  
have also been used to finance private transfers  
to individual households.
 There has been substantial external support for  
CDD programmes, notably from the World Bank. 
Between 2000 and 2008, the World Bank lent  
US$1.3 billion per year for CDD programmes.1  
More recently, CDD programmes have also  
received funding support from UK aid and from  
the International Rescue Committee.
 1.1  
Evolution of CDD programmes
 The origin of CDD programmes can be traced  
to ones that were established to mitigate the social 
costs of structural adjustment.i Interventions such  
as the Emergency Social Fund in Bolivia and the 
Programme of Actions to Mitigate the Social Costs  
of Adjustment in Ghana were the foundation  
for the World Bank’s social fundsii – the first kind  
of CDD programmes.
 CDD programmes have evolved in several  
ways. The first shift was from being emergency 
compensatory programmes to alternative delivery 
mechanisms for social services, bypassing 
government to work directly with communities.2 
Donor interest in community participation was  
fuelled by growing disillusionment with the capacity  
of developing-country governments to provide 
high-quality public services.3 
 Over time, the administration of CDD programmes 
was devolved to local governments at the district  
or sub-district levels. These programmes were part  
of a new wave of decentralisation, as they supported 
the devolution of governance. 
 CDD programmes that initially focused only on 
creating local public infrastructure were increasingly 
used to create local governance structures and 
community-based organisations. This development  
is reflected in recent programmes that explicitly  
focus on using CDD to improve local government.
 This focus on improving local governance is  
seen clearly with the most recent CDD programmes 
implemented in conflict-affected contexts.  
These programmes are called community-driven 
reconstruction (CDR). The focus on governance  
has, in some cases, been part of a broader agenda  
to promote democracy. 
 In line with these changes, the objectives of  
CDD programmes have also shifted over time. 
Programmes in the early 1990s emphasised  
poverty reduction and infrastructure building, 
whereas those in the late 1990s and 2000s focused 
on increasing decentralisation and improving  
local governance and social cohesion. Among the  
23 programmes included in this evidence synthesis 
report, the share supporting decentralisation  
rose from 40 per cent in the 1990s to 75 per cent  
in the 2000s.
 1.2 
About this evidence synthesis study 
 The rapid scale-up of CDD programmes in the  
1990s was not matched by a similar rise in robust 
evaluations.4 However, in recent years there have 
been a number of high-quality impact evaluations, 
including randomised controlled trials in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia  
and Sierra Leone.5 
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‘ Among the 23 programmes 
included in this evidence 
synthesis report, the share 
supporting decentralisation 
rose from 40 per cent in  
the 1990s to 75 per cent  
in the 2000s.’
 i Structural adjustment programmes promoted market-oriented 
institutional and macroeconomic reforms as a response  
to the developing country debt crisis. The criticism of adverse  
social effects was highlighted in Cornia and others (1987).
 ii  Social funds were set up across Latin America, Africa and  
Asia, often with World Bank support, in the late 1980s and early 
1990s. They focused on community projects, in most cases  
with community engagement using a CDD approach.
 We synthesised evidence from those programmes 
for which we were able to identify relevant impact 
evaluations meeting our definition – studies that 
assess the effectiveness of interventions using  
a counterfactual. We also made a clear distinction 
between CDD programmes and community-based 
development programmes, in which communities  
are consulted but do not manage the programmes.6 
We excluded community-based development 
interventions. 
 We included CDD programmes that met these 
inclusion criteria:
 Financial management is devolved to communities;
 A whole community benefits, rather than individuals 
or households; and 
 The programme offers a multisector menu of local 
development projects that focus mainly on public 
infrastructure.
 1.4  
Report structure
 The sections of this report follow the causal chain  
of CDD programmes. We review CDD’s objectives 
and design, including the theory of change for CDD 
(section 2). Section 3 presents evidence of what  
CDD programmes have financed and the impact  
on social outcomes, such as access to health  
and education. In section 4, we discuss the impact  
on social cohesion and governance, including  
an analysis of participatory processes in CDD 
programmes. In section 5, we explore the question  
of equitable development – how CDD targets and 
engages with marginalised populations and women. 
Finally, in section 6 we draw out implications for 
research, policy and programming.
 The objective of this synthesis study was to  
assess how CDD programmes have evolved over  
the years. We were interested in examining whether 
programme objectives and design had changed  
over the decades and how effective CDD had  
been in improving outcomes. We also aimed to 
analyse the barriers to and facilitators of programme 
implementation. Specifically, we were interested  
in testing the numerous assumptions underpinning 
CDD’s theory of change, particularly the link between 
community participation and social cohesion.
 1.3  
Methods
 We synthesised evidence from 25 impact 
evaluations, covering 23 programmes in 21 low-  
and middle-income countries (Figure 1). This is the 
first evidence synthesis report on the effectiveness  
of CDD programmes that also draws on findings  
from implementation research. We systematically 
compiled evidence from 88 programme documents, 
process evaluations and qualitative research papers 
covering these 23 programmes to examine the 
factors influencing success and failure. Indonesia is 
the only country where we found impact evaluations 
for three different CDD programmes. In the rest  
of the countries, impact evaluations were found  
for just one programme. Hence, except for Indonesia, 
we sometimes take the liberty of referring just  
to the name of the country when citing examples. 
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 Figure 1: Countries where impact evaluations were found
 How do CDD programmes work?
 2.2  
Project selection
 In CDD programmes, community members  
usually select development projects at a community 
meeting organised by either an existing community 
organisation or a newly established community 
project committee that is set up for the programme. 
CDD does not imply that communities can choose 
any kind of local development project. Most of  
them (19 of the 23 we reviewed) had a positive list  
of permissible projects. Nearly a quarter combined  
a positive list and a negative list of ineligible items 
and projects. The proposed project is screened  
for approval by the implementing agency, which 
could be the national or local government, an NGO  
or a governance entity created for the programme.
 2.3  
Community project management
 Most CDD programmes require a community  
project committee to be set up to manage the 
development projects. There may also be a separate 
maintenance committee. The three programmes  
that were exceptions – those that did not have 
community project committees – were Latin American 
or Caribbean social funds from the 1990s. In those 
cases, the projects were managed by NGOs or  
local municipalities.
 Project committees may be based on existing 
groups, self-selected from influential community 
members, appointed or elected. Elections have 
become more common over the years as CDD 
programmes have focused more on governance 
issues. However, elections may be combined  
with mechanisms to engage with local leaders,  
such as appointments. For example, the committee 
could include the village head and head of the facility 
being rehabilitated, as well as elected members  
of an existing community-based governance body, 
such as a school-based management committee. 
There could also be requirements to include women 
or representatives of marginalised populations. 
 The use of elections required the CDD agency  
or local implementing partners to be more closely 
engaged in managing the community process,  
since communities usually have little experience  
in organising elections. In general, project committee 
selection is no longer left for community members  
to work out on their own, as was the case in some 
earlier CDD programmes.
 The CDD programmes reviewed in this report have 
two main defining characteristics: (1) communities 
are involved in the identification, implementation  
and maintenance of the supported community-
development projects; and (2) the projects benefit  
the whole community or selected target groups,  
not individuals. That is, the programmes deliver 
public, not private, goods. However, in some cases 
they may provide what are called group goods and 
services – for example, goods and services used  
by identifiable groups, such as farmers.
 The CDD programme implementing agency  
typically carries out communication and outreach 
activities to make communities aware of the 
programme and build support for broad participation. 
Reaching out to communities is especially important 
when communities have to apply for funding  
of development projects (the application model) 
compared with when communities are selected  
by the implementing agency (the allocation model).
 2.1  
Public awareness 
 National programmes have used mass media, 
including television, radio and print media, as well  
as leaflets and posters to disseminate information.  
In Afghanistan, a television soap opera promoted  
the programme,7 whereas in Indonesia, the Badan 
Reintegrasi Aceh – Kecamatan Development 
Program (BRA–KDP) radio drama helped  
explain the details of the programme in easily 
understandable language and in a humorous 
manner.8 Professional associations, such as  
parent–teacher associations and informal networks, 
have also been used to spread information about  
a CDD programme.
 At the community level, information was shared  
in meetings with community members or just 
community leaders. Other channels for raising 
awareness included posters, cartoon handbooks  
and announcements in churches and mosques,  
as in Afghanistan9 and the DRC;10 town criers  
in Sierra Leone;11 sending invitation letters  
for the meeting in Indonesia;12 and a roadshow  
in Afghanistan.13 
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 The community project committee oversees 
implementation of the community project, managing 
financial resources, procuring materials and hiring  
a contractor. The committee and other community 
members may receive training in project and financial 
management, governance, and technical training  
for maintenance.
 The CDD programme implementer usually facilitates 
the process of community participation in project 
selection and management. The provision of external 
facilitation has grown over time. It was provided in 
just half of CDD programmes from 1990 to 1999, but 
in all programmes from 2000 onwards. Facilitation  
is intended to increase participation and build 
community capacity in project management. 
 Facilitation may be carried out by a single community 
facilitator covering several communities or by  
a dedicated team of workers in a specific community. 
For instance, the Kecamatan Development Program 
(KDP) in Indonesia had community facilitators 
recruited from the village where the programme  
was being implemented; it also had facilitators at the 
sub-district level to look after technical infrastructure-
related matters and participation-related issues  
(Box 1). The National Solidarity Program (NSP)  
in Afghanistan, on the other hand, contracted NGOs 
to serve as ‘facilitating partners’ for implementation  
of the programme.14 In the Philippines, facilitation 
was managed by municipal-level teams.15
 Facilitators worked on increasing the participation  
of women and marginalised groups and they  
also played a part in conflict resolution. In CDR 
programmes, this meant working on ensuring the 
participation of ex-combatants and conflict victims. 
 Responsibility for maintenance of facilities built  
or rehabilitated rested with the relevant line ministry, 
if the government was the implementer. However,  
the responsibility for maintenance could also rest  
with the community.
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‘ The provision of external 
facilitation has grown over 
time. It was provided in just 
half of CDD programmes 
from 1990 to 1999, but  
in all programmes from  
2000 onwards.’
5 Box 1: Facilitators of the KDP  
in Indonesia
 KDP appointed village facilitators (fasilitator 
desa) and sub-district facilitators (fasilitator 
kecamatan) who had different roles and 
positions in the implementation system. At the 
village level, two facilitators were elected, one  
of whom had to be a woman. The role of village 
facilitators was to introduce the programme  
to village residents and local leaders, organise 
meetings at the hamlet and village level for 
discussing and prioritising project ideas, link the 
community with outside assistance and ensure 
that project implementation ran smoothly.  
Most village facilitators lived in the villages  
they represented,16 and were typically recent 
high school graduates, asked to take the job  
as service to the community. They received a 
small stipend (approximately US$10 per month) 
to cover their operational expenses.17 
 At the sub-district level, two facilitators were 
appointed by the implementing agency. One 
facilitator was supposed to focus on technical 
issues, such as infrastructure design, quality 
checks and budgeting. The other was meant  
to focus on social participation issues.18 
 KDP tailored its facilitation efforts in conflict-
affected settings. In Aceh, additional information 
facilitators were hired at the sub-district  
level to help coordinate activities with other 
development programmes. These facilitators 
were meant to help coordinate the collection 
and sharing of data and share information 
related to the peace process.19
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 2.4  
Community contributions
 Community members were usually required to 
contribute cash, materials or labour to the project.  
In the CDD programmes included in this study, 
community contributions ranged between 5 and  
50 per cent of the total project cost. In the majority  
of cases the required contribution was below  
25 per cent, sometimes varying with the type  
of project. In some cases, communities chose 
between contributing in cash or in kind, but some 
programmes required both. For example, Moldova’s 
Social Investment Fund required a contribution  
of 15 per cent of project cost, of which at least  
3 per cent had to be in cash.20 
 2.5  
Theory of change
 The theory of change for CDD programmes  
has two sets of outcomes: (1) social welfare; and  
(2) social cohesion and governance. As shown  
in Figure 2, CDD programmes support building  
or rehabilitation of public infrastructure, such as 
schools, health centres, water supply and sanitation 
facilities. Creation of this social infrastructure  
is expected to improve social welfare outcomes. 
Facilitation of participatory development gets 
communities to work together and learn by doing. 
The inclusive and transparent participation process 
presumably leads to an improvement in social 
cohesion and governance.
 6
 To varying degrees, CDD implementers facilitate  
the participatory process and provide training  
in managing development projects. Either the 
implementer selects the communities that participate 
in the programme, or communities are required  
to apply for funding. If communities are required to 
apply, then the implementer must carry out public 
awareness activities to inform communities about  
the opportunity.
 There are several assumptions underpinning this 
theory of change. For communities to apply for the 
programme, they need to know about it. For the 
participatory process to be truly inclusive, poor  
and marginalised community members should be 
involved in project implementation and have a say  
in decision-making. 
 There are assumptions being made about 
implementer and community capacity. CDD 
implementers should have the capacity to support  
the project by providing the necessary level  
of training and facilitation, and communities  
should have the capacity to manage and maintain  
the project.
 For improved social welfare outcomes, community 
projects need to be adequately funded and 
complementary resources for infrastructure use 
should be in place, along with adequate operations 
and maintenance arrangements. 
 The participatory development process is meant  
to increase trust in the community and improve 
governance. Increased trust is expected to improve 
social cohesion, as we assume the community  
lacks social capital.
 Figure 2: Theory of change
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 How has the public infrastructure created by CDD 
programmes affected the availability and quality  
of social infrastructure and welfare outcomes? 
Overall, we find that CDD programmes have made  
a substantial contribution to improving the quantity  
of small-scale infrastructure. However, they have  
had a weak effect on health outcomes and a mostly 
insignificant effect on education and other welfare 
outcomes (Figure 3).
 3.1  
Impact on infrastructure creation
 CDD programmes have supported large numbers  
of community projects that have often covered  
a wide geographical area. For example, more than 
80,000 projects in 22,000 villages were supported  
in the second phase of the World Bank’s support  
to KDP in Indonesia;21 nearly 55,000 projects  
were undertaken on over 40,000 poor rural 
communities in Brazil;22 and the National Fund  
for Social Compensation and Development 
(FONCODES) in Peru supported more than 12,500 
projects.23 The Kapitbisig Laban sa Kahirapan – 
Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social 
Services (KALAHI–CIDDS) programme in the 
Philippines supported 8,206 projects in 6,136 
barangays (smallest administrative division).24 
 These projects have resulted in a substantial 
increase in infrastructure creation, particularly  
for building or rehabilitating schools, health centres, 
water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) facilities, 
roads and rural electrification. The numbers  
of facilities created or rehabilitated often extend to 
thousands, particularly for long-running programmes. 
For example, more than 10,000 new classrooms 
were constructed in Yemen25 and more than 3,000 
classroom blocks and 4,000 school latrines were  
built in Zambia.26 Some projects provided equipment; 
more than 360,000 school desks were supplied  
in Honduras.27 More than 100 health centres  
were constructed or rehabilitated in Afghanistan, 
Nicaragua and Senegal.28 More than 57,000 septic 
tanks and latrines were constructed in Honduras,29 
2,800 clean water units and 1,300 sanitation units 
were provided in Indonesia30 and nearly 1,400  
water projects were supported in Peru.31
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‘ These projects have resulted 
in a substantial increase  
in infrastructure creation, 
particularly for building or 
rehabilitating schools, health 
centres, water, sanitation  
and hygiene facilities, roads 
and rural electrification.’
 Figure 3: CDD programme effects on social welfare
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 3.2  
Impact on social welfare
 3.2.1  
Education
 Since CDD programmes generally rehabilitate 
existing facilities rather than create them, they may 
improve quality but not access. For example, in 
Sierra Leone, 45 per cent of project communities  
had a primary school, compared with 46 per cent  
of control communities, but construction quality  
was significantly better in project communities.32 
 In general, however, we cannot tell from most  
studies whether the CDD investment improved 
facilities, since we do not have information on  
what happened in the comparison group. Finding  
no impact may mean there were improvements  
in treatment and comparison areas, which is likely,  
as CDD programmes cover only some communities. 
For example, in Yemen, the Social Fund for 
Development built 7,685 new classrooms between 
2006 and 2009, which was 30 per cent of the total 
number of classrooms built nationally over that 
period. Some of the other 70 per cent may have  
been in comparison areas used for the impact 
evaluation. So, the comparison tells us the quality  
of CDD-funded community projects compared  
with that of other programmes.
 In general, CDD-supported investments are  
of comparable or better quality, although there  
are some exceptions. In Honduras, 70 per cent  
of beneficiaries rated the construction of water 
facilities as good, but the figure was 90 per cent  
in non-programme areas. There was also  
a problem with the construction of toilets in schools 
and electrical installations, with 20 per cent not 
working in programme schools, compared with  
just 4 per cent in non-programme areas.33
 The impact of CDD programmes on school  
quality is best seen from the before-versus-after 
comparison, which is only reported for the Poverty 
Reduction Fund in St Lucia, which shows the  
largest improvement in the seven cases for which 
there are measures of impact on school quality.34
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‘ As CDD programmes have 
not focused on addressing 
specific contextual barriers 
to enrolment, attendance or 
learning, the lack of impact 
may be expected.’
9 Overall, the impact evaluations find no impact 
enrolment or attendance (measured in 12 cases)  
or improved test scores, although test scores were 
measured in just three cases. As CDD programmes 
have not focused on addressing specific contextual 
barriers to enrolment, attendance or learning,  
the lack of impact may be expected. The study of  
the Poverty Reduction Fund in St Lucia, for instance, 
states, ‘Given the high prevailing level of school 
registration in St Lucia, Poverty Reduction Fund 
projects are not aimed at increasing the enrolment 
rate, but rather at improving the quality of facilities’.35 
 Three programmes are exceptions in terms of 
improvements in enrolments, in Afghanistan, Peru 
and Nicaragua. However, these programmes are not 
exceptions to the observation that CDD-supported 
facility improvements do not seem to affect 
attendance. Investments in schools were marginal  
in the NSP in Afghanistan, so it is more likely that  
the effects came from the NSP’s emphasis on female 
participation, which may have addressed cultural 
barriers related to the movement and activities of girls 
and women.36 In Peru, in addition, to construction  
and rehabilitation, FONCODES implemented  
a centrally managed school uniform and school 
feeding programme, where the latter was shown  
to have improved attendance.37 In Nicaragua,  
the Emergency Social Investment Fund (FISE) 
schools had more teachers than non-FISE schools, 
which contributed to the increase in enrolment.38 
 The provision of additional components does  
not necessarily guarantee an impact. Program 
Nasional Pemberdayaan Mandiri (PNPM)  
in Indonesia provided uniforms, school supplies, 
scholarships and a transport subsidy. However,  
there was no effect on school attendance, which 
suggests that cost was not the binding constraint  
for the households receiving these benefits.39 
 3.2.2  
Health
 Overall, CDD programmes have no significant  
impact on health facilities. This finding is due,  
at least in part, to the ‘CDD impact evaluation 
problem’; in other words, the impact of the quality  
of health facilities is being measured for all treatment 
communities, including those where no investments 
were made in health, which dilutes the effect.  
This problem is less for education as education  
is the most common investment.
 Results for nine programmes show that access  
to and use of health services improved significantly, 
although the magnitude of the effect is small.  
In Sierra Leone, 25 per cent of project villages  
had a traditional birth attendant house compared  
with just 8 per cent for the control.40 The largest 
positive impact on the use of health services is seen 
with PNPM Generasi in Indonesia – an extension  
of PNPM that focused on health.41
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 Overall, health outcomes improved marginally,  
but there is significant variability across programmes. 
As in the case of education, where there have  
been improvements in outcomes, CDD projects 
supported more than just facilities. The CDD 
programmes that had no impact on health include 
those where there were no substantial investments  
in health.
 The Bolivia Social Investment Fund’s investments  
in health centres and water supply systems  
resulted in a significant reduction in the mortality  
of children under five years of age. Investments in 
health centres went beyond improving infrastructure, 
including provision of medicines, medical supplies, 
radios for calling ambulances, motorcycles for 
supporting outreach to patients and improving 
communication with regional centres and hospitals. 
The investments led to an increase in the use  
of health centres, particularly for prenatal care,  
which likely contributed to the reduction of mortality 
of children under five.42 
 The National Rural Infrastructure Project in Senegal 
led to an improvement in the nutritional status  
of children in poor households. The improvement 
was attributed to an increase in access to clean  
water and healthcare facilities. The programme’s 
agricultural infrastructure projects also led to  
a significant increase in household expenditures  
per capita, which may have driven the improvement 
in child nutrition.43 
 The CDR programme in Liberia did not lead to an 
improvement in either access or health outcomes – 
assessed in terms of sickness of children under  
five years of age. In this case, communities chose  
to invest in the construction of community facilities, 
including palaver huts (traditional, circular huts)  
and government guesthouses. The treatment 
communities also had fewer existing health facilities, 
as they were more rural and less accessible to  
the main road.44 The lack of results on access and 
health outcomes is therefore not surprising.
 What is clear from these studies is that the size  
and kind of investments made in health are important 
for improving access to services and outcomes. 
Complementary interventions, such as water supply, 
transportation and income-generating projects, can 
also improve health outcomes.
 3.2.3  
Water supply and sanitation
 Evidence from eight programmes shows WASH 
community projects have a significant impact  
on improving access to improved water and 
sanitation. This improvement is strongest for the 
before-versus-after comparison for the Poverty 
Reduction Fund in St Lucia. There, the share  
of households having drinking water and water  
for domestic use rose by 53 and 57 percentage 
points, respectively.45 
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 In the case of clean water, a focus on rehabilitation  
in some cases meant investments did not result  
in increased access. In Honduras, approximately  
90 per cent of households had access to clean water 
in both treatment and comparison communities,46  
but there was improved access in the case  
of sanitation projects. Moreover, 90% and 82% of 
households in project areas used sewerage and 
latrines, respectively, compared with 78% and 66%  
in comparison communities that had been accepted 
by the programme but had not yet begun activities.47 
 Investments in WASH infrastructure have reduced 
the time required for collecting water, which studies 
of three programmes have measured. In Yemen,  
40 per cent of households reported a reduction, 
compared with 10 per cent in a comparison  
group from communities that had not yet received  
the project.48 In Honduras, there was a small but 
significant reduction of nearly one hour per month 
spent collecting water in Honduran Social Investment 
Fund communities compared with non-Honduran 
Social Investment Fund communities.49 
 In St Lucia, the proportion of households with  
a drinking water supply in their house or yard jumped 
from 35% to 88%, and the proportion of water for 
domestic use rose from 34% to 91%. Consequently, 
the proportion of people who regularly had to fetch 
water from outside decreased from 69% to 21%.  
The time saved mainly benefited women, as they 
were usually assigned this task. Seventy-five per 
cent of households involved in a community project 
stated that they had more time available.50 
 3.3  
Economic investments and outcomes
 CDD programmes have not had an overall  
impact on economic outcomes. They had no effect  
on income and expenditure in the six programmes 
where this outcome was assessed. On average, 
there was also no effect on employment for the  
three programmes where it was assessed. There  
are short-run employment effects during project 
construction that are not captured in these studies.
 Of the three programmes, the Philippine  
KALAHI–CIDSS programme is an exception,  
with a 4 percentage-point increase in the likelihood  
of employment. The effect was driven by an  
increase in female employment as a result of greater 
economic activity generated by the project, rather 
than project-related employment opportunities.51
 Data from four programmes show that they lead  
to an increase in asset ownership. However,  
these results are driven entirely by the large impact  
of the National Fadama Development Project  
in Nigeria, which included the provision of private 
asset transfers for building individual livelihoods. 
 There was no significant impact in the other  
three programmes where asset ownership was 
measured (DRC, Liberia and Sierra Leone).  
In these three programmes, block grants were  
made to communities rather than individuals.
 There is no improvement in the use of infrastructure, 
including transport infrastructure. However, there  
is variability across programmes. The provision of 
roads for the National Fadama Development Project 
led to improved access to transportation services. 
The use of roads for productive purposes, such as 
agricultural input and output transportation, increased 
substantially.52 In the Philippines, the large number  
of roads financed by the KALAHI–CIDSS programme 
had a positive impact on accessibility. Roads led  
to lower transport costs and greater household 
mobility, and increased the proportion of houses that 
were accessible through the year, increasing access 
to utilities and business opportunities.53 
 However, CDD programmes in the DRC, Senegal 
and Afghanistan had no impact on infrastructure 
access and use. In Afghanistan, transportation  
and irrigation projects were both found to be  
of limited effectiveness, although they accounted  
for a significant proportion of the grant expenditure. 
For instance, local transportation projects (which 
included bridges, footbridges, culverts, secondary 
and tertiary road resurfacing, retaining walls  
and access roads) accounted for 16 per cent  
of block grant expenditure in treatment villages.  
The lack of impact has been attributed to issues  
with project design and maintenance.54 In Senegal, 
the lack of impact was attributed to the late 
implementation of road projects.
 3.4  
Cost-effectiveness
 CDD programmes have sometimes, but not always, 
been more cost-effective than alternative delivery 
mechanisms, in which the government or NGOs  
have completely managed the programme. There  
is limited evidence on cost-effectiveness. The 
available evidence suggests that local government  
is systematically cheaper. 
 The most comprehensive analysis is from  
a World Bank study of social funds, which made  
cost comparisons in Armenia, Honduras, Nicaragua 
and Zambia.55 The comparisons are with central 
government, local government and NGOs. The 
results from this analysis are shown in Figure 4,  
in which the figure measured on the vertical axis  
is the ratio of construction costs for the agency  
type (horizontal axis), compared with the social fund 
for that country and construction type (which thus  
by definition has a value of 1). Each green dot  
is a cost comparison, and the brown dots show the 
average ratio for that agency. The sectors covered 
are education, health and water supply.
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 Figure 4 shows that the cost estimates for local 
government are consistently lower than those for 
social funds, while those for central government are 
generally higher, and higher on average. However,  
a more recent cost analysis carried out for the KDP  
in Indonesia found that KDP-managed construction 
of water supply, roads or bridges and irrigation 
schemes cost roughly half (44 per cent cheaper)  
of what the same projects would have cost using 
local government contractors.56 A large part of these 
savings came from the use of community labour  
for the construction of infrastructure.
 The main conclusion from this discussion is that  
the cost advantage of CDD approaches is not 
proven, but may be present. It is, however, likely  
to vary depending on context. Further research  
is required on cost-effectiveness.
 3.5  
Sustainability
 The evaluations reviewed in this synthesis were  
all undertaken only a few years after implementation 
of the community projects was completed, so there  
is no direct evidence of sustainability. Instead, we can 
consider the likelihood of sustainability by examining 
whether the necessary conditions are being met.
 There are three pre-conditions for sustainability: 
 Technical sustainability: are CDD-supported works 
and infrastructure of good technical quality and 
properly maintained? 
 Institutional sustainability: are institutional 
mechanisms in place so that the responsibility for 
who does what, in terms of implementation and 
maintenance, is clear?
 Financial sustainability: are financial resources 
allotted and available to meet recurrent costs  
and maintenance expenses for CDD-supported 
public works?
 3.5.1  
Technical quality
 In some countries, such as Brazil57 and Indonesia,58 
CDD-supported infrastructure has generally been 
reported as being built to a high quality. However, 
poor quality of works has been mentioned as an 
issue in Afghanistan, Armenia, Honduras, Malawi, 
Nicaragua and Peru.59 
 A study of construction quality in Malawi found  
that, of 121 school blocks and teachers houses 
sampled, 35% of the school blocks and 18% of  
the teachers’ houses were reported to have serious 
defects, with almost 50% of the school blocks  
having some damage on the floor.60 Beneficiaries  
in Malawi reported that the roads were below 
standard and that latrines had collapsed a few  
weeks after construction.61 In Afghanistan, an 
evaluation report states: ‘40–45 per cent of the 
13,000 projects are of good quality, but for the others 
there is concern that the quality will not be as good 
because the community development councils  
have insufficient capacity.’62 
 The poor quality of infrastructure has been blamed 
on the lack of technical specifications given to 
contractors, the quality of contractors and the quality 
of supervision. In schools in Honduras, for instance, 
contractors were not given technical specifications  
to make connections to the mains for electricity.  
This meant that 28 per cent of the installations built 
by the Honduran Social Investment Fund remained 
unconnected, compared with 4 per cent of those  
built by other agencies.63 
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‘ The cost advantage  
of CDD approaches is not 
proven, but may be present. 
It is, however, likely to  
vary depending on context.’
 Figure 4: Cost-of-construction comparison of  
CDD programmes compared with other agencies  
(ratio of cost to CDD programme)
 Cost ratio
 Average cost ratio
 Note: Derived from Rawlings et al. (2004).
Ratio of costs  
to social fund costs
5.0
4.0
3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
Central 
government
Local  
government
Other 
donors
NGOs
13 Community-driven development: does it build social cohesion or infrastructure? A mixed-method evidence synthesis
 A lack of technical specifications was blamed  
for variable and poor-quality construction in 
Afghanistan,64 Armenia65 and Nicaragua.66 Poor 
supervision, poorly qualified contractors and 
engineers and insufficient capacity of implementing 
agencies have resulted in poor-quality projects  
in Afghanistan, Armenia, Malawi, Nicaragua and 
Peru. In Armenia and Jamaica, the awarding of 
contracts to the lowest bidder irrespective of their 
track record has hampered the implementation  
of community projects.67 
 In contrast, in Zambia, the use of standard blueprints, 
training provided to contractors and supervision  
of construction by district education buildings officers 
helped in maintaining high quality in construction.68
 3.5.2  
Institutional sustainability
 Institutional mechanisms for ensuring quality 
construction have included: (1) providing standard 
blueprints; (2) selecting and training private sector 
contractors who are right for the job; (3) on-site 
supervision; and (4) commissioning a quality 
assessment of completed works. The presence  
of these institutional mechanisms varied greatly 
among the CDD programmes included in this 
synthesis. Some programmes have all of them  
in place, and some have none.
 Issues have arisen about programme implementers’ 
capacity to supervise large numbers of projects  
and lack of enforcement of quality provisions  
in construction contracts. In Peru, for example, only 
20 per cent of FONCODES-supported construction 
projects were subject to supervision.69 For CDD 
programmes implemented through local government 
structures, as was the case in Indonesia and the 
Philippines, the implementing agency was able  
to provide more on-site supervision of construction 
and ensure compliance with procedures. In the  
case of the Armenian Social Investment Fund,  
where work was of inferior quality, the contractor  
was paid less than the full amount agreed in the 
contract, rather than rejecting the work and requiring 
it to be built to standard.70
 Arrangements for maintenance have sometimes 
suffered from a lack of clarity about roles and 
responsibilities. For example, responsibilities  
may be split between the local government and 
community project committees, but there is a lack  
of clarity on who does what and when. This situation 
can result in low participation by the community  
in project maintenance.
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 3.5.3  
Financial sustainability 
 The cost of maintenance has been borne by  
a central agency, shared between a government  
or implementing agency and the community, or  
borne wholly by the community. When the CDD 
implementing agency is solely responsible for 
financing operations and maintenance, such  
as in St Lucia, then it can be doubtful that financial 
sustainability will be achieved.71 The Nicaraguan 
government established a maintenance fund  
for FISE,72 whereas the Moldova Social Investment 
Fund provided for maintenance from its core 
operating budget.73 
 Other programmes put in place local financing 
mechanisms. Under the NSP in Afghanistan,  
for instance, households had to pay a monthly fee  
in cash or in kind for covering depreciation costs  
and for appointing technicians to maintain project 
facilities.74 User fees were charged for public  
services provided under the Social Investment  
Fund in Bolivia.75 
 Recurrent expenditures for operations, notably 
salaries, are more likely to come from central 
government agencies. This would only be  
required if new infrastructure is created rather  
than rehabilitated. For example, in Nicaragua, the 
responsible government ministry or agency became 
the owners of the facilities, for which they committed 
themselves to financing the operations and 
maintenance costs.76 
 Despite these measures, lack of funds for operations 
and maintenance is frequently mentioned as an 
issue, because communities have not been able  
to contribute, as in Afghanistan,77 or there was a lack 
of commitment from central agencies, as in Benin.78 
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 Impact of CDD on social cohesion  
and governance 4
 Six impact evaluations assessed meeting  
attendance and participation as an activity related  
to social cohesion for six programmes. There is  
no effect found on this measure for the large CDR 
programmes in Afghanistan, the DRC, Indonesia and 
Liberia, while positive effects are seen in Honduras 
and Sierra Leone. However, the overall average  
effect across all six programmes is not significant.
 Five impact evaluations assessed skills related  
to social capital, such as better mobilisation, 
managerial and other related skills. All of the studies 
except one (Sierra Leone) reported insignificant 
impacts. However, even in Sierra Leone, the average 
effect is small.
 Fifteen impact evaluations reported on bonding  
social capital or community-level social cohesion. 
None of them found a significant impact, with the 
effect size commonly close to zero. Hence, the  
overall effect size is close to zero and not significant.
 Ten impact evaluations reported bridging social  
capital with the local leadership. All but one case 
(Poverty Reduction Fund in St Lucia) are insignificant. 
There is also some heterogeneity, as three studies 
report small to moderate negative effects, which  
are insignificant. The overall effect size is, however, 
very small and insignificant.
 Five studies report on bridging social capital with 
government. It is always insignificant, with a negative 
but insignificant overall average effect.
 Six studies report the impact on governance. There 
are some examples of significant impacts – for 
example, on participation in local governance in Sierra 
Leone – but the average effect is insignificant for all 
six programmes, as is the overall average effect.
 This clear finding that CDD had no impact on  
social cohesion echoes what is consistently reported 
in earlier literature. The World Bank’s review of  
social funds concluded that they ‘operated as users 
rather than producers of social capital’.79 A slightly 
later World Bank review of CDD programmes  
similarly concluded that ‘much more success has 
been achieved in community-based development  
or CDD projects on quantitative goals, such as  
the construction of infrastructure, than on qualitative 
goals, such as capacity enhancement or quality  
of training’.80  A recent impact evaluation of the  
GoBifo programme in Sierra Leone concludes that 
there is ‘no evidence that GoBifo led to fundamental 
changes in the way in which community members 
interact or in their capacity to act collectively  
outside the immediate sphere of the project’.81 
 A meta-analysis of CDD programme effects shows 
that they have had no impact on social cohesion, 
decentralisation or governance. The analysis 
captured three separate aspects of social capital  
or social cohesion: 
 Bonding social capital or community-level social 
cohesion, which included measures of trust  
and cooperation between community members; 
 Bridging social capital, which included measures  
of social connectedness, especially to those in 
authority; and 
 Governance, which included measures such  
as participation in decision-making and the political 
process.
 For all three aspects of social cohesion outcomes, 
the overall effects were very small and never 
significant. This result is consistent, and there is  
little variation across most of the included studies 
(Figure 5).
 Social cohesion has been the most closely studied 
outcome of CDD programmes. A number of studies 
reported findings on various indicators of social 
cohesion at each stage of the causal chain:
 Figure 5: CDD programme effects on social cohesion
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 Another review of impact evaluations of CDD 
programmes concludes that ‘there is no evidence, 
however, that CDD transforms local decision-making 
or empowers the poor in any enduring way’.82 
 4.1  
Why have CDD programmes failed to have  
an impact on social cohesion?
 According to the theory of change, the community 
participates in project identification, management 
and implementation. The participatory and inclusive 
process is meant to build trust among community 
members and improve governance. The learning  
by doing in this process is meant to create social 
cohesion and improve the ability to collectively 
undertake more projects in the future. However,  
this review finds that the assumptions made for this 
theory of change to work may not be quite realistic. 
We examine the reasons in this section.
 4.1.1  
Limited community participation in  
decision-making
 The CDD process is meant to begin with the 
community meeting where the project is identified. 
How participatory is this meeting, in practice?
 Data on community awareness and participation  
in meetings were available for just nine CDD 
programmes. Figure 6 shows a clear funnel of 
attrition; community participation declines along  
the chain of participation in decision-making.  
All programmes show a consistent declining trend. 
On average, 73 per cent had heard of the CDD 
programme, but only 57 per cent were aware of the 
meetings related to it. Forty-one per cent attended 
the meetings, but only 16 per cent spoke at the 
meeting and a slightly lower percentage were  
aware of the cost of the project. Qualitative data  
also support the observation that the majority in  
the community had limited engagement in actual 
project selection. 
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 Figure 6: Proportion of households participating: the funnel of attrition
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 4.1.2  
What are the reasons for limited community 
participation?
 CDD programme design may favour the elite: 
Prominent community members, rather than the 
community as a whole, influence project identification 
the most. This is especially the case in the application 
model, in which the elite or the prime movers  
played an active role in applying for the project. 
Illiterate villagers could not fill in the programme 
forms, as was mentioned in the evaluation of NSP  
in Afghanistan.83 
 Community leaders frequently made project 
applications for the Jamaica Social Investment  
Fund without extensive consultation with community 
members. Consultation often meant simply informing 
people rather than taking their views into account.84 
In Malawi and Zambia, community members  
who attended the meeting were informed about  
the need for material contributions, such as bricks 
and sand, rather than consulted on the choice of 
community project.85 People participated in making 
bricks, not decisions.
 Just as the choice of project is usually determined by 
a few community leaders, actual management of the 
project is not undertaken by the whole community, 
but by the few people who are in the community 
project committee. The requirement for community 
contributions may engage a large proportion of the 
community, but their role is restricted to making cash, 
in-kind or labour contributions, and does not include 
decision-making. 
 In Malawi and Zambia, traditional leaders mobilised 
the community and used sanctions to enforce the 
contribution requirement. Fines in the form of money, 
livestock or labour contributions were imposed  
on community members who did not contribute.86 
 Communication and outreach activities for 
encouraging participation may also favour educated 
members of a community. Mass media channels 
such as radio, television and newspapers may not  
be effective in reaching community members unless 
they are appropriately customised. In Aceh, people  
in rural areas were reluctant to read print materials 
about BRA–KDP, such as Q&A-style advertisements 
published in newspapers. Purchasing a newspaper 
takes time and money, and some community 
members said that it was difficult to understand  
the technical language used in the advertisements. 
Radio was also ineffective in the case of the  
BRA–KDP, as the radio drama aired on national 
public radio, while the target audience had a strong 
preference for local stations.87 
 Customised communication materials that included 
visual aids have been useful for disseminating 
information about programmes. To reach illiterate 
intended beneficiaries, NSP in Afghanistan printed  
a cartoon handbook to explain each phase of the 
programme.88 However, there is very little information 
on whether such customised communication material 
has been used across programmes, for example  
to address the needs of illiterate populations or to 
deliver material that has not been translated into  
local languages.
‘ People participated in  
making bricks, not decisions.’
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 Intra-community divisions: Most CDD programmes 
have defined a community as a geographic 
administrative unit, which ignores the multiple ways 
in which a community may be divided. In Yemen, 
many communities are divided along political  
and tribal lines. In some cases, these divisions  
have prevented communities from coming together  
to agree on the services they needed or the location 
where these services would be provided.89 Similarly, 
in some areas in Afghanistan, different groups  
within communities found it difficult to participate  
in the community development committee (CDC) 
because of long-standing enmities and conflicts. 
They were able to participate only after proportional 
representation for different groups was negotiated.90 
In some cases, influential individuals opposed a  
more broadly representative CDC, as their authority 
was being challenged by the elected body.
 Lack of cooperation from local leadership:  
Qualitative research highlights instances where  
CDD programmes have been seen as an external 
imposition that threatens the authority of existing 
leadership. In Indonesia, village heads sometimes 
retained control over decision-making on village 
administration, planning and development. The KDP 
principles of community participation, transparency 
and accountability were therefore not followed.91  
In Afghanistan, religious leaders and community 
members in some areas resisted the programme  
as ‘anti-Islam’ or ‘an American trick to trap them’.92
 Perceived benefits from participation: Community 
participation depends on whether members  
perceive the benefit of participation. In Moldova, 
participation was highest in school-related projects, 
since most members were parents.93 In Jamaica, 
households without school-aged children did  
not participate in the rehabilitation of schools.94 
Attendance in village- and sub-village-level meetings 
was significantly higher for BRA–KDP,iii compared 
with the regular KDP in Indonesia because the  
former funded livelihoods proposals from individuals. 
More people attended the BRA–KDP meetings  
where the selection of beneficiaries took place. 
Participation subsequently declined.95 
 The opportunity cost of participation may be  
another barrier. In Afghanistan, people were more 
occupied with farming during the spring and summer 
months. Although winter was more conducive  
for securing community participation, accessing 
communities was a challenge for programme staff.96 
 Lack of programme rules and facilitation to 
encourage participation: Some CDD programmes 
had minimum attendance requirements for the 
community meeting at which projects were selected. 
For example, the Moldova Social Investment Fund 
required 25–30 per cent of the community members 
to be present for communities of fewer than 2,000 
people, if a decision had to be taken at the meeting.97 
In addition, the fund required a house-to-house 
referendum vote to confirm the project priorities 
chosen in the community meeting.98 However, not  
all of the programmes had prescribed participation 
rules. For those that did have them, we found no 
information on how they were enforced and whether 
they worked in improving participation.
 Facilitators employed by the implementation  
agency can also play an important role in improving 
participation, as happened under KDP (Box 1). 
Sustained engagement over the years, rather than  
a single-project approach, can encourage deeper 
participation. In Indonesia and the Philippines, 
participation in village meetings increased as 
subsequent rounds of funding became available.  
In contrast, lack of finance and facilitation resulted  
in poor participation in the second phase of the 
National Fadama Development Project in Nigeria.99 
 Our analysis shows that the nature, intensity  
and duration of facilitation varies greatly among 
programmes. However, there is no evidence  
on whether facilitation improves participation in  
the long term or empowers different groups in the 
community to participate actively in decision-making 
beyond the scope of the project supported by the 
CDD programme.
 4.2  
Why do CDD programmes not improve 
governance?
 CDD programmes have sometimes created parallel 
community-level organisations that can create  
friction with local leaders, have negative effects  
on governance outcomes and sometimes serve  
no purpose after the completion of the projects.
 A community may be defined in a way that is not 
consistent with existing administrative boundaries.  
In the DRC, the Village Development Committee 
combined several existing villages, so the Village 
Development Committee and higher-level CDCs 
were new bodies whose coverage did not correspond 
to the existing administrative unit.100
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 iii The Badan Reintegrasi Aceh (Aceh Peace Reintegration  
Agency) (BRA), with technical assistance from the World Bank, 
adapted the community-based block grant mechanism used  
by the Government of Indonesia’s Kecamatan Development Program 
(KDP) to target conflict-affected villages. Community-Based 
Reintegration Assistance for Conflict Victims, or BRA–KDP,  
involved communities in identifying conflict victims and determining 
the assistance they should be receiving.
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‘ Political divisions may  
exist between groups within  
a community or between 
communities. These may  
not correspond exactly to the 
administrative units typically 
used for implementing  
CDD programmes.’
 In Afghanistan, where the CDC corresponded  
to a subset of the village or a group of villages,  
the impact evaluation of the NSP found a negative 
impact on the quality of local governance. The  
CDCs created for the programme were of limited 
institutional relevance beyond project completion. 
The study found no impact on the probability that  
the key decision makers in the village were affiliated 
with the CDC. The study also used village benefit 
distribution analysis to assess programme impact on 
the equity of food aid distributions by village leaders. 
The evaluation showed that the presence of the 
CDCs increases the incidence of embezzlement  
of funds. In this case, the presence of an additional 
community organisation created ambiguities.  
After completing the NSP-funded projects, the  
role of the CDC may have become unclear.101 
 Similarly, the impact evaluation of Tuungane in  
the DRC concludes, ‘It may be more fruitful to try  
to build on existing local governance capacity rather 
than seeking to change it.’ Traditional leaders enjoy 
considerable legitimacy and are not considered 
authoritarian and their dominance in decision-making 
does not necessarily reflect elite capture.102 
 Although there may be governance-related  
issues in post-conflict countries, it cannot be 
assumed that these challenges are at the village 
level. Political divisions may exist between groups  
within a community or between communities.  
These divisions may not correspond exactly to the 
administrative units typically used for implementing 
CDD programmes. They are therefore unable  
to create sustainable changes in local participatory 
institutions and governance structures. 
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 Do CDD programmes promote equity? 5
 Most CDD programmes have identified poor and 
vulnerable populations as their target beneficiaries. 
Most CDR programmes, on the other hand, identified 
conflict-affected people and ex-combatants as their 
target groups. To reach them, CDD agencies and 
implementers have used different targeting methods, 
facilitated the community participation process  
and mandated requirements, such as quotas, to 
ensure a more diverse representation of community 
members in the project committees.
 5.1  
Targeting CDD and CDR programmes
 CDD programmes used geographical targeting 
methods, such as poverty maps, to allocate 
resources.iv For example, the Rural Poverty 
Reduction Project in Brazil used government  
data and indices, such as the General Index  
of Socio-economic Development and Municipal 
Human Development Index, for identifying poor 
states, regions or municipalities.103 
 Analysis of six World Bank social funds and  
a more recent analysis of the Tanzania Social Action 
Fund show that geographical targeting of CDD 
programmes led to allocation of resources to poorer 
areas, but not always the poorest communities  
in those areas. In St Lucia, 47% of the programme’s 
resources directly benefited households in the 
bottom 30% of the income distribution, and only  
11% were received by households in the top 30%  
of the distribution.104 The Peruvian social fund 
FONCODES, for instance, reached the poorest 
districts, but not the poorest households in them. 
Better-off households were slightly more likely  
to benefit than poorer households.105 
‘ CDR programmes face  
a particular challenge in 
identifying conflict-affected 
populations. Accessing 
reliable, impartial data  
to identify groups within  
a population may be difficult, 
and the very act of targeting 
can be a sensitive process.’
 iv A poverty map calculates an overall index for geographical  
units in the country, such as districts. The map may be  
based on income or expenditure poverty measures, but  
more commonly uses a range of socio-economic indicators.
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 CDR programmes face a particular challenge  
in identifying conflict-affected populations.  
Accessing reliable, impartial data to identify groups 
within a population may be difficult, and the very  
act of targeting can be a sensitive process.106 
 For BRA–KDP in Indonesia, facilitators helped 
communities identify conflict victims who would  
be the main beneficiaries of the programme.107 
However, the idea of labelling individuals or subsets 
of households as conflict victims was controversial  
in the early stages. In many cases, the unwillingness 
to label people led to communities requesting  
that funds be allocated equally to all individuals  
or households. Some communities said that they 
would prefer to receive no assistance if the funds 
could not be divided in an equal way.108 And indeed, 
the evaluation of BRA–KDP showed that conflict 
victims and non-victims were equally likely to  
benefit. There is also evidence that the programme 
resulted in conflict victims having lower acceptance 
of ex-combatants. This increased social tension  
may have been due to combatants receiving cash 
grants that were meant for victims.109
 5.1.1  
What have we learned about targeting?
 Our analysis shows that several programme  
design elements influence who benefits.
 The elite play an important role in the application 
model of CDD programmes: The nature and  
extent of awareness-raising activities affect which 
communities apply to the CDD programme under  
the allocation model, which was the most common 
model. In contrast, CDR programmes used an 
allocation model. 
 In Zambia, the social fund used the annual 
Headmasters’ Conference as an outreach channel, 
which is part of the reason why a large share of funds 
was used for rehabilitating schools.110 In Zambia  
and Malawi, public sector workers, such as teachers 
and health workers, have been important in project 
committees. They have also worked closely with 
traditional authorities in the community to get them  
to support the application process.111 
 The approach in the KALAHI–CIDSS programme in 
the Philippines led to fewer applications from poorer 
and less geographically and politically connected 
villages.112 Similarly, better-off communities were far 
more likely to apply for funding under the Tanzania 
Social Action Fund. However, the allocation of  
funds was more pro-poor at the local level. The  
fund applied eligibility rules, including defining 
vulnerable populations that counteracted the bias  
in applications. Although targeting was found to be 
pro-poor, the funds still flowed towards households 
that had high levels of civic engagement and were 
connected to the local elites.113
 As mentioned earlier, the role of the elite or the  
prime movers in the community is important in the 
demand-driven application model. The elite are  
both more likely to know about the programme  
and more likely to have the skills and the networks 
necessary to submit a proposal. They may be able  
to influence community decisions because of their 
status, wealth or education.
 The type of community project influences who 
benefits: The type of project selected by the 
community determines which households benefit 
from the project. In Nicaragua, FISE used a poverty 
map based on national household living standards 
data for targeting the poor. An impact evaluation  
that examined FISE’s targeting at the municipal, 
community and household levels found that the 
social fund’s investments in latrines, schools and 
health posts benefited poor communities and 
households. There was an element of self-targeting. 
Investments in water systems were poverty neutral. 
However, sewerage projects benefited those who 
were better-off. In this case, the nature of the projects 
had a bearing on who benefited from the projects.114
 Community contribution requirements can  
restrict benefits to poorer and marginalised areas  
and populations: The inability to pay can limit  
the participation of poorer communities and  
poorer groups within communities. During the 
implementation of the Armenian Social Investment 
Fund, several projects with high potential benefits  
to poor people had to be dropped, as very poor 
communities could not come up with the required  
15 per cent contribution. The fund then lowered  
the community contribution to 10 per cent for all local 
development projects and 5 per cent for communities 
identified as poor, based on an assessment  
of poverty and capacity to pay. A significant 
improvement in the number and range of community 
contributions occurred after the rules changed.115 
‘ The elite are both more  
likely to know about the 
programme and more  
likely to have the skills and 
the networks necessary  
to submit a proposal. They  
may be able to influence 
community decisions 
because of their status, 
wealth or education.’
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 However, the 10 per cent contribution requirement in 
Armenia still deterred the poorest rural communities 
from applying for new schools or water facilities.116  
In Nigeria, many community projects for women  
and vulnerable people have not been implemented 
because the targeted groups could not pay  
their contributions.117
 5.2  
Facilitating the participation  
of marginalised people and ethnic and 
religious groups
 CDD programme implementers have employed 
facilitators to increase the participation of 
marginalised populations. In Sierra Leone, for 
instance, GoBifo facilitators divided the community 
into groups – women, youth and men. Each group 
had to come up with its own development plan.  
This approach was meant to encourage women  
and young people to express concerns, something 
that they may have been uncomfortable doing  
in the general meetings.118
 In the case of BRA–KDP in Indonesia, a special  
effort was made to involve ex-combatants by 
separately interacting with them or recruiting  
some of them as facilitators or programme staff.119
 In Liberia and the DRC, programme implementing 
staff were responsible for engaging with diverse 
power holders in the community. In the DRC,  
an advisory board had to be established to engage 
with a range of local leaders. 
 The advisory boards were meant to include different 
religious and ethnic leaders, government officials, 
political leaders, business leaders and members  
of chambers of commerce, civil society leaders, 
chiefs, and women and youth leaders.120 In Liberia, 
the community mobilisers were responsible for 
looking out for elite capture and spotting changes in 
local conflict issues that could trigger the resurgence 
of violence. They also had to set up an advisory 
group including five influential people from different 
groups – older and younger men, older and younger 
women, ex-combatants, ethnic groups and the 
physically challenged. Programme staff sought the 
help of this advisory group for resolving conflicts.121
 Although measures were taken to improve  
the participation of marginalised groups within  
a community, there is no evidence on their  
impact. There is also no information about how 
programme implementers facilitated the participation 
of different ethnic and religious groups living  
in a community. Most studies do not report either 
quantitative or qualitative data regarding this issue.
 5.3  
Women’s participation in CDD programmes
 Although women rarely feature in the objectives of 
CDD programmes,v they are named as a beneficiary 
target group in 15 out of the 23 programmes included 
in this review. Most programmes also had rules  
or measures for encouraging women’s participation 
in community project identification and on project 
committees, implying an assumption that engaging 
women means that they will be more likely to benefit 
from supported projects. 
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 v The exceptions are Benin and Senegal.
23
 Several CDD programmes either had an  
indicative target for the percentage of women on  
the project committee or a rule for ensuring female 
representation on it. In Afghanistan, community 
members had to vote for two people, one man  
and one woman, although this requirement was 
waived in areas affected by conflict.122 In Sierra 
Leone, women were required to serve on the  
village development committee and be co-signatories 
to community bank accounts.123 Women typically 
served as the treasurer on community committees, 
as they were considered more trustworthy for 
handling finances.124 Similarly, in Malawi, women  
held senior positions in the project committees,  
such as chairperson, treasurer or secretary.125
 CDD programmes also targeted women by either 
mandating that proposals come from women’s 
groups or offering projects aimed at women’s  
groups. In Nigeria, attention was paid to ensuring  
that proposals came from women’s groups.126  
For KDP, at least one proposal from every village  
had to come from a women’s group, with these 
proposals reviewed in a meeting where only  
women participated.127
 Women were also targeted by including relevant 
items on the menu and ensuring they got access  
to employment. In Yemen, the programme’s menu 
included projects such as community midwife 
training, literacy classes and schooling for girls.128 
Women were also targeted through employment 
opportunities with CDD-funded projects. In Moldova, 
women had to be offered a higher share of 
employment opportunities for project-related work.129
 5.3.1  
To what extent do women participate in  
CDD programmes?
 Data available for seven CDD programmes  
(Figure 7) show that women are only half as likely  
as men to be aware of CDD programmes, even less 
likely to attend the community meetings and even 
more less likely to speak at them.vi Women are less 
likely than men to participate in CDD programmes, 
with participation declining along the causal chain. 
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 Figure 7: Women’s participation in CDD programme activities
 vi This lower participation by women is also reported in a broader review 
(Mansuri and Rao 2013) of more than 500 participatory programmes. 
Participants of such participatory development programmes tend to  
be male, wealthier and better educated, and with better connections.
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 Generally, women are under-represented in project 
committees. Committee members are, on average, 
nearly three times more likely to be men than 
women.vii Women’s participation in these committees 
also varies across contexts – a reflection of the 
difference in gendered social norms about women’s 
roles in public life, as well as differing emphasis on 
women’s inclusion across programmes.
 Mandating the inclusion of women in the project 
committee may not make a difference to participation. 
In the DRC, a comparison was made between 
communities that had to fulfil a gender parity 
requirement for project committees and those  
with no such requirement. Even in communities 
where there was no such requirement, women 
accounted for 30 per cent of committee members.130 
Gender-related requirements also may not  
be enforced. Two of the five elected committee 
members in Yemen’s Social Fund for Development 
were required to be women, but on average there 
were fewer than two, with the average declining  
over time.131
 Where female participation is a target, not  
a requirement, women’s participation appears to  
fall short. In Malawi, women made up 25 per cent  
of committees against a target of 50 per cent.132  
In Zambia, in the early years of the social fund, 
women accounted for only 3% of committee 
members, prompting the target to be lifted from  
20% to 50%.133
 5.3.2  
What have we learned about women’s 
participation in CDD programmes?
 Mandating the participation of women does  
not change the power dynamics of participation  
in the short term: Gendered cultural norms and 
socio-economic factors powerfully and negatively 
influenced the participation of women in the public 
sphere. Gendered household and labour roles 
greatly increased the opportunity cost of attending 
meetings. The meeting times often did not take into 
account when women are busy with household  
or other responsibilities. Structural discrimination 
also meant that higher illiteracy among women was 
cited as yet another reason for their poor participation 
in project meetings and other activities.134
 Women’s participation challenged traditional  
power relations that men have in the public domain. 
In the first phase of the NSP in Afghanistan, men  
and women reportedly did not sit together to create 
the community development plan.135 Although  
the NSP mandated gender equality in CDC elections, 
project selection and project management, such 
rules have encountered resistance. Male relatives 
may control voting decisions, precluding women’s 
participation in CDCs, or de-prioritise projects 
favoured by or benefiting women.136 Women may  
not contest gendered power relations for the sake  
of the way a programme has been designed.  
For example, women in Afghanistan have reportedly 
given their votes to their male relatives, who elected 
an all-male senior CDC, which approved project 
proposals.137 Where women have to be involved, 
there were reported instances where a powerful man 
then controls his wife or sister to act on his behalf.138
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 vii Calculated from data in sources for Figure 7.
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 An impact evaluation of the second phase  
of NSP in Afghanistan found mixed effects of the 
programme on gender norms. Men’s acceptance  
of women in leadership positions at local and 
national levels had increased, as had women’s 
participation in local governance. These results 
were mainly attributed to the NSP mandating 
women’s participation in their supported projects 
and the fact that the programme offered women  
a platform where they could engage with men.  
Yet, the impact evaluation found that NSP did  
not lead to any change in men’s attitudes towards 
women’s economic and social participation or  
girls’ education.139
 Women’s participation is also tied to their socio-
economic status in the community. The creation of 
separate female farmer groups in Nigeria increased 
women’s participation in Nigeria. However,  
only a few women could be part of these groups. 
Membership was highly related to a woman’s 
economic and social ties with others in the 
community and the support she received from men. 
Men who were involved in farming helped women 
who worked in the processing sector gain access to 
the project. The most successful women were those 
who had worked out such productive arrangements 
with their husbands or a male relative.140
 Similarly, as part of the Indonesian PNPM,  
women-only forums were meant to encourage  
them to express their ideas and opinions  
and participate in decision-making. However, an 
assessment of PNPM found that, although women’s 
participation in village-level meetings increased, 
decision-making was often limited to the elite  
and the activists among participating women. 
Although women dominated the discussion at  
the women-only forums, men could still influence 
the decision-making process. In some cases, 
women’s suggestions were renegotiated at the 
village level.141
 Women’s participation varies depending on the  
type of activity: In Afghanistan, women were more 
involved in project selection than in the election 
process, as they saw the latter as a male domain.142 
Similarly, a gendered division in the roles in the 
KALAHI–CIDSS programme in the Philippines 
meant that women were more likely to participate  
in proposal selection and preparation, while men 
were more likely to participate in local project 
implementation.143
 Many of the construction-related activities – 
contracting, supervision and construction work  
itself – were male-dominated areas. In Yemen, 
women were less visible or involved during the 
implementation of the project, particularly when  
it required supervision of work involving construction, 
such as roads.144 Managing construction or labour 
contracts was seen as a male-dominated area.145  
In Indonesia, despite the fact that KDP achieved  
high levels of women’s participation in decision-
making, men were nearly four times more likely  
to be employed in project work.146
 Longer-running programmes have increased 
women’s participation by using multiple measures: 
The rules and measures taken to improve women’s 
participation have shown results, in the case  
of long-running programmes, such as the KDP in 
Indonesia and the KALAHI–CIDSS programme  
in the Philippines (Box 2). 
 Box 2: Design elements to increase 
women’s participation: the case of KDP, 
Indonesia, and KALAHI–CIDSS, 
Philippines
 Longer-running programmes, such as KDP  
in Indonesia and KALAHI–CIDSS in the 
Philippines, have incorporated several design 
elements to increase women’s engagement  
in the CDD process. 
 In Indonesia, these measures included:
 Intense facilitation to improve the participation  
of marginalised and poor women, such as  
women who were the heads of households  
or women who had no primary education;
 Facilitation for preventing elite women from 
dominating decision-making;149
 Separate meeting invitations to women;150
 Appointment of women as village facilitators, 
members of Unit Pengelola Keuangan 
(Kecamatan financial unit), operations, 
maintenance and monitoring teams; 
 Fifty per cent representation on every  
village delegation for kecamatan-level  
decision-making meetings;151 and
 A microfinance component for funding  
women-only credit groups.152
 The KALAHI–CIDSS programme in the 
Philippines offered special training to women  
to participate in public decision-making  
and to equip them for paid construction-work 
opportunities funded under the programme. 
Three per cent of the grant to the community 
could be used to pay for training women  
to acquire skills.153
‘ Gendered cultural norms 
and socio-economic  
factors powerfully and 
negatively influenced the 
participation of women in  
the public sphere.’
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 Women’s participation in meetings is higher  
in villages where KDP was being implemented, 
compared with villages where it was not.147  
By the end of the Philippines KALAHI–CIDSS 
programme, 53% of the community facilitators  
were women, 55% of the community members that 
participated in barangay assemblies were women, 
and 58% of committee members were women,  
over half of whom had leadership positions.148 
 But women’s participation in CDD programmes  
may not necessarily empower them to take on active 
roles in the public sphere after the programme ends. 
A review of five CDD programmes in Indonesia, 
including KDP, found that the programmes had  
only a weak impact on women’s empowerment.154 
Women’s credit groups had little impact because  
they rarely included poor women. These groups also 
focused on women’s traditional economic activities 
(cooking, sewing and kiosks) and did not offer  
new opportunities. Women’s participation in CDD 
programmes also did not spill over into participation 
in other governance-related activities, such as  
village planning or elections.
 Overall, our analysis shows that CDD programmes 
have features that encourage women’s participation 
in meetings and village committees. However,  
less attention has been paid to their participation  
in project implementation, operation, maintenance 
and monitoring. Women’s empowerment is not  
listed as a programme objective, which may be  
why programmes do not consistently have features 
encouraging women’s meaningful participation.  
The design of CDD programmes will benefit from 
assessments of the context-specific constraints that 
women face.155 For empowering communities, it 
would be imperative to have objectives that translate 
into measures for encouraging the participation  
of women and other marginalised populations.
 Few studies have carried out sex-disaggregated 
analysis of participation. Fewer still have assessed 
whether CDD programmes have empowered women 
to take a more active role in the public sphere, 
beyond the scope of the programme. A recent 
assessment of the gender-related features of the 
World Bank’s long-running rural CDD programmes 
recommends that future studies capture the quality  
of participation and its outcomes, particularly  
with respect to the economic, political and social 
empowerment of women.156
‘ For empowering 
communities, it would  
be imperative to  
have objectives that  
translate into measures  
for encouraging the 
participation of women  
and other marginalised 
populations.’
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 Implications for policy, programming  
and research 6
 6.1  
Overview of findings
 CDD programmes have evolved over the last  
30 years to become a well-established approach  
to development in low- and middle-income  
countries. Development donors, particularly  
the World Bank, have invested a large amount  
of money in these programmes. 
 Over these last three decades, CDD programmes 
have moved from being a response to mitigate  
the negative effects of structural adjustment to 
becoming an alternative mechanism for quicker 
delivery of presumably cheaper public infrastructure. 
However, in the past decade or so, there has been 
additional emphasis on using CDD for building  
social cohesion, increasing decentralisation and 
improving governance.
 Figure 8 highlights our findings on the effectiveness 
of CDD programmes across the causal chain in  
the theory of change. CDD programmes improve 
facilities for education, health, water and sanitation. 
They slightly improve health- and water-related 
outcomes, but not education. 
 The lack of impact on higher-order outcomes  
can be explained by CDD’s focus on infrastructure, 
without providing complementary inputs to address 
context-specific challenges in health and education. 
The figure also shows that CDD programmes  
have no impact on social cohesion or governance. 
This is a consistent finding across contexts.
 We find that the assumption that the entire 
community is involved in decision-making is not  
valid. Attempts to reform governance have run  
into problems, especially when they have tried  
to create parallel structures.
 Figure 8: 
Overview of effects
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‘ We find that the assumption 
that the entire community  
is involved in decision-
making is not valid.  
The pathways of change 
leading to improvement  
in social cohesion are 
particularly unclear.’
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 The pathways of change leading to improvement  
in social cohesion are particularly unclear. Social 
cohesion has been defined as behaviours and 
attitudes within a community that reflect members’ 
propensity to cooperate.157 If this is used as a  
working definition, then it is unclear how the inclusive 
process of community participation in implementing 
development projects automatically engenders 
cooperation. CDD programmes may actually  
be users rather than producers of social capital.158
 There is also a need to distinguish between 
interpersonal and inter-group social cohesion.  
The definition of a community in terms of  
a geographic administrative unit is a limited one.159  
A community may consist of different groups,  
in which class, caste, ethnicity, age and sex reflect, 
reinforce and reproduce determinants of exclusion 
and inequality. It is unclear how CDD programmes 
specifically address, traverse or change them. 
 There are numerous socio-economic barriers to 
community participation – lack of time, exclusionary 
or limiting norms, perceived benefit or capacity,  
the community contribution requirement, poor 
engagement of the CDD agency and projects  
not serving community members’ interests. 
Gendered cultural and socio-economic barriers  
affect women’s and vulnerable or marginalised 
populations’ participation. However, these barriers 
vary depending on the context. 
‘ There are numerous  
socio-economic barriers  
to community participation –  
lack of time, exclusionary  
or limiting norms, perceived 
benefit or capacity, the 
community contribution 
requirement, poor 
engagement of the CDD 
agency and projects  
not serving community 
members’ interests.’
 Explicit mechanisms to make CDD more inclusive –  
for giving women and marginalised community 
members more of a voice – have had mixed success. 
Mandating women’s participation through programme 
rules, such as quotas for female membership  
on project committees, have generally, though not 
always, achieved greater representation for women.  
Such formal requirements work better than indicative 
targets, but there is no evidence to show that 
increasing women’s representation in meetings  
or on project committees has helped them benefit 
more from CDD-financed activities. There is also  
no evidence to show that increasing women’s 
participation empowers them to take on a more active 
role in public life, beyond the scope of the project. 
 6.2  
Implications for CDD policies and 
programmes
 The evidence from this synthesis and previous 
studies suggests that it may be better to abandon  
the CDD programme objective of building social 
cohesion and focus instead on sustainable,  
cost-effective delivery of small-scale infrastructure. 
However, it remains to be proven that CDD 
programmes are a cheaper delivery mechanism  
than local government and NGOs. The evidence  
may change depending on the context. 
 Programme implementers need to assess  
if community members are willing or able to make 
contributions to development projects. Contribution 
requirements can restrict benefits received by poor 
and marginalised participants. Targeting strategies 
and programme rules, such as quotas, can help  
in increasing their participation. However, facilitation, 
training and additional support would be required  
to sustain participation in the long term. 
 Moving beyond the definition of a community  
as a geographic administrative unit and considering 
different groups and gendered power relations  
in the community would help in delivering more 
equitable programmes.
 Since small-scale infrastructure is a major 
programme output, implementers should pay explicit 
attention to the technical, institutional and financial 
mechanisms in place for ensuring that these facilities 
are maintained and operate properly. Approaches  
to operations and maintenance have been variable. 
Project documents have revealed that communities 
face numerous challenges in maintaining projects. 
However, programmes such as KALAHI–CIDSS in 
the Philippines have used good practices that are 
worth learning from.
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 While designing CDD programmes, a number  
of decisions on the various trade-offs need to  
be considered:
 The institutional set-up of the CDD implementer,  
as an independent agency or as part of an existing 
ministry or department, influences the impact  
of the programme in different ways. There is  
a trade-off between the possible greater efficiency 
and flexibility of an independent agency and the 
greater government buy-in and sustainability of  
the processes implemented by an existing ministry. 
Social funds that ran for years show that more 
integrated work between the local and national 
governments can facilitate greater local ownership 
and promote institutional sustainability. Where 
decision-making authorities exist, the creation  
of parallel governance structures may not serve  
a purpose beyond the scope of the programme,  
and may even undermine attempts at more  
inclusive governance. 
 The choice between using an application-based 
model and an allocation model should be informed  
by community capacity, financing and programme 
targeting objectives. Where communities must  
apply for funds, the better-off tend to benefit,  
as leaders have the wealth, education and capacity 
to put together the application. Allocating funds to  
the poorest communities may require more training 
and support for project implementation. Reaching  
the poorest communities and supporting projects  
in those communities takes more time and effort.
 There is a trade-off between breadth and depth  
of coverage – deciding whether to reach more 
communities or spend more in each. Community 
engagement with the programme appears to  
be greatest where funding has been continuous. 
Provision of facilitation has increased participation  
of various groups in a community in long-running 
programmes, such as KDP. But such depth  
of coverage takes resources away from reaching 
more communities.
 6.3  
Implications for research
 This synthesis sheds light on the numerous areas 
where there is limited or no evidence about CDD’s 
effectiveness. It also shows us how problematic 
assumptions made about the programme have 
influenced evaluation designs, research questions 
and analyses. We offer some important pointers  
on further research in this area.
 6.3.1  
Shift emphasis from social cohesion
 Many of the CDD programmes and their impact 
evaluations have had a misplaced emphasis  
on social cohesion. Implementers and evaluators 
assume that social cohesion needs to be built  
in the countries where such programmes are being 
implemented. They assume that CDD increases 
collective action beyond the scope of the project. 
Both are problematic assumptions.
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 Communities already have decision-making 
structures. Attempts to bypass these existing 
structures can create tensions. After project 
completion, if the mandate of the new governance 
structure created for programme implementation  
is not clearly defined, the sustainability of the 
arrangement is questionable.
 The concept of social cohesion is a complex  
one. Most impact evaluations have assessed both 
bonding social capital, such as trust and cooperation 
within the community, and bridging social capital, 
such as social connectedness with authority.  
It would be important to consider the possible  
friction between these elements of social capital.  
For example, if cooperation and trust among 
community members increase, they may be more 
likely to come together to complain about the misuse 
of funds and corruption of authorities. The increase  
in bottom-up accountability may not necessarily 
contribute to building trust with authorities. 
 6.3.2  
Assess the political economy  
of local decision-making
 Quantitative impact evaluations have not assessed 
the political economy of local decision-making or the 
different levels of existing social cohesion: between 
households, between sub-groups (for example,  
men versus women, poor versus rich), between 
community leaders and households, between 
villages, and between local and central government. 
 A political economy analysis would consider  
if participatory governance is integral to the  
existing political system. If so, how inclusive is it? 
Can different groups in the community participate  
on equal footing (for example, women, youth, old 
people, physically challenged people)? Is facilitation 
required for the community to participate or to  
do so in a more inclusive manner? If so, how much 
facilitation and training is required? Is the training 
provided to the community project committee 
sufficient for improving governance? Is CDD subject 
to elite capture? What are the characteristics of 
existing power hierarchies and levels of cohesion?
 6.3.3  
Widen and sharpen the focus of rigorous  
impact evaluations
 Although the latest generation of impact evaluations 
have used more rigorous designs to establish  
causal relationships, they have generally ignored 
issues related to the type of institution involved  
in implementation, targeting of communities and 
sustainability of arrangements. Impact evaluators 
have suggested that the small size of the grants, 
particularly when viewed on a per capita basis, may 
be one reason CDD programmes do not improve 
welfare outcomes. Future studies need to examine 
how factors such as grant size, continuity of funding, 
facilitation of community participation and provision 
of training over the long term improve outcomes 
across the causal chain.
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 6.3.4  
Address the CDD impact evaluation problem
 Evaluations have looked at a broader range  
of outcomes, such as health, education and  
WASH-related outcomes in a given programme. 
However, these estimates run into the ‘CDD impact 
evaluation problem’. The demand-driven approach 
across multiple sectors means most estimates  
are diluted; for instance, they measure the impact  
on health outcomes in all communities, irrespective 
of whether investments were made on health  
projects in those communities. Study designs  
should consider using a ‘treatment of the treated’  
or instrumental variable approach to get more 
meaningful impact estimates for these outcomes.
 6.3.5  
Factor in what is going on in the  
comparison group
 Studies generally give insufficient information on  
the comparison communities or groups. We do  
not always know if there is nothing going on in the 
comparison group or if there is an alternative delivery 
mechanism or agency working in the area. Where 
baseline data are available, the single difference 
estimate of indicators, such as quantity and quality  
of infrastructure, should be reported, as well as the 
double difference estimates.
 6.3.6  
Focus	on	practical	significance	 
as	much	as	statistical	significance
 The studies we reviewed focus on statistical 
significance rather than practical significance. 
Cost-effectiveness analysis is one way of enhancing 
a study’s practical significance. A cost comparison  
of CDD programmes and other delivery channels  
is one of the most important areas for future 
research. This would allow cost-effectiveness  
or cost–benefit analysis to be carried out and  
capture the practical significance of the impacts.  
This is important, as the cost-effectiveness  
of CDD approaches is not proven.
 6.3.7  
Carry out equity-focused qualitative research  
and process evaluations
 We looked for qualitative research and process 
evaluations to analyse the mechanisms influencing 
the impact of CDD programmes. However, there 
were few such studies. The evaluation of impact  
is best located in a broader evaluation framework. 
We need more process evaluations and qualitative 
research for causal chain analysis – for assessing 
why and for whom programmes work or do not  
work at each stage of implementation. 
 Evaluations should assess the extent of participation 
of community members, particularly based on sex 
and age, and also on vulnerability or marginalisation 
of different groups in the community. The few studies 
that have done this mainly look at participation  
in project committees and meetings. More studies 
should examine involvement in project decision-
making and CDD’s effects on women’s agency  
and empowerment beyond the scope of the project. 
Well-designed gender- and equity-responsive 
mixed-method research would throw more light  
on the barriers to participation in different contexts.
‘ We need more process 
evaluations and qualitative 
research for causal chain 
analysis – for assessing why 
and for whom programmes 
work or do not work at each 
stage of implementation.’
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 Appendix 
List of programmes and countries included for synthesis
Country Programme
Afghanistan National Solidarity Program
Armenia Armenian Social Investment Fund
Benin Borgou Region Pilot Rural Support Project
Bolivia Bolivia Social Investment Fund
Brazil Rural Poverty Reduction Project
Democratic Republic of Congo Tuungane (Let’s Unite)
Honduras Honduras Social Investment Fund 
Indonesia Badan Reintegrasi Aceh – Kecamatan Development Program
Indonesia  Kecamatan Development Program  
(renamed National Community Empowerment Program in Rural Areas  
or PNPM-Rural in 2006)
Indonesia  Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat – Generasi Sehat  
dan Cerdas (National Community Empowerment Programme –  
Healthy and Smart Generation)
Jamaica Jamaica Social Investment Fund
Liberia Community Driven Reintegration and Reconstruction
Malawi Malawi Social Action Fund
Moldova Social Investment Fund
Nicaragua  Fondo de Inversión Social de Emergencia  
(Nicaraguan Emergency Social Investment Fund)
Nigeria National Fadama Development Project
Peru  Fondo Nacional de Compensación Desarrollo Social  
(National Fund for Social Compensation and Development in Peru)
Philippines  Kapitbisig Laban sa Kahirapan  
(Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social Services project) 
Senegal National Rural Infrastructure Project
Sierra Leone GoBifo (Forge Ahead)
St Lucia Poverty Reduction Fund
Yemen Social Fund for Development
Zambia  Zambia Social Recovery Projects I and 2  
(later called Zambia Social Investment Fund)
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